Immoral Quantity Question

Is the quantity of negative effects from an immoral action, relevant to someone's morality?

In my previous post; Moral Quantity Question, I determined that moral actions do not seem to be in equal ratio to someones perceived “morality”. Rather, someone's intentions seem to be the fundamentals for their morality. This seems to apply to credit, for performing an action perceived as positive, or blame for performing an intended negative action. But what about when someone performs an action with positive intentions, and a negative outcome is only an unintended side effect?

If the unintended negative side effect is outside of the individuals knowledge or awareness, then it seems they are not to be blamed. But, when the individual is aware of the negative side-effects, and performs the action anyway, is the degree of effect from the negative side-effect in equal ratio to their immorality? The difference in this scenario, from an intentional moral action, is that the individual is not performing the action in order to cause the negative result. The negative result is likely circumstantial. For eg, if someone pollutes carbon dioxide for 1km of driving, as a negative side-effect that they’re aware of, would that be in equal ratio to their immorality, compared to if they drove 100km? In both cases, they had positive intentions of transportation to somewhere useful.

Perhaps it comes back to their estimate of probability, as it often seems to. If they estimate that the positive effects for their actions outweigh the negative, to a reasonable degree, then maybe they are being less immoral. It seems that in this scenario, there is an extra step involved in the equation for morality. In order to determine someone’s intentions (which seem to be the basis of morality), they must 1st compare their perceived positive outcome for their actions, to their perceived negative side-effects from the action. If they perceive that the negative side-effect is miniscule, compared to the positive outcome, then they are being immoral only to a low degree. If they estimate the positive outcome to be minimal, but the negative side-effect to be significant, then they are being immoral to higher degree.

The quantity, or degree, of the negative side-effect itself, does not seem to be the determinant for immorality, but rather, the comparison of that side-effect, to the overall positive gain, caused by their action. The person might be immoral to a lower degree, for polluting the 100km, compared to 1km, as long as their intended positive outcome for that longer drive, outweighed that negative side-effect of pollution, more significantly than their intended positive outcome for the 1km drive outweighed that smaller portion of negative side-effect. 

In another scenario, if someone performed an action with an intended positive result, and a small negative side-effect, then later, in other circumstances, they avoided causing that same positive result, because it would cause more significant negative side-effects, it seems they should be less to blame. Their calculation of positive compared to negative side-effect changed, even though the particular positive effect would be equivalent. 

It seems that when an individual performs a positive action, with negative side-effects which they are aware of, there is that extra step involved to calculate their intentions, of their perceived comparison between the positive and negative effects. The quantity of negative effects still does not seem to be a direct measurement of how immoral someone is, even though it will often reflect the fundamentals of the degree of immorality. Intentions (with a bit more complexity to determine), again seem to be the real quantity to be questioned for immorality.